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Abstract—Intel(R) Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a
hardware-based technology for ensuring security of sensitive
data from disclosure or modification that enables user-level
applications to allocate protected areas of memory called
enclaves. Such memory areas are cryptographically protected
even from code running with higher privilege levels. This mem-
ory protection can be used to develop secure and dependable
applications, but the technology has some limitations: (i) the
code of an enclave is visible at load time, (ii) libraries used
by the code must be statically linked, and (iii) the protected
memory size is limited, demanding page swapping to be done
when this limit is exceeded. We present DynSGX, a privacy
preserving tool that enables users and developers to dynami-
cally load and unload code to be executed inside SGX enclaves.
Such a technology makes possible that developers use public
cloud infrastructures to run applications based on sensitive
code and data. Moreover, we present a series of experiments
that assess how applications dynamically loaded by DynSGX
perform in comparison to statically linked applications that
disregard privacy of the enclave code at load time.
1. INTRODUCTION
We live in an increasingly more connected world, where
people are constantly uploading personal data to environ-
ments that cannot be controlled by them. Sometimes this
data is meant to become public, but in most cases they are
concerns about its confidentiality and/or integrity. In that
sense, developers need to find ways to protect their users’
data from theft or improper modification at all costs.
Besides that, developers and companies often host their
applications in public cloud environments in order to in-
crease their availability and scalability, or even to lower
costs spent on physical infrastructure [1]. In such envi-
ronments, multiple applications from different owners may
reside in the same physical server, making it possible for
rogue cloud users to exploit existing security breaches to
obtain secret data from other users.
Security of data based solely on software usually falls
short due to vulnerabilities existing in the application devel-
oped, in libraries/resources used by the application, or even
in the operating system/virtualization technology [2]. Con-
sidering that, higher security levels have been demanded.
In response to this demand, over the course of the past
decade, several efforts were made to define and implement
a security enabler called Trusted Execution Environment
(TEE) [3], [4], [5]. To put in a few words, TEE is a
secure area of the main processor, or a separate, dedicated
processor, that guarantees that code and data stored inside
it will not be modified or disclosed without permission. It
was first specified by GlobalPlatform [6], and since then
has attracted attention from several companies that have
provided their own implementations [7], [8], [9].
One of these implementations is Intel SGX [8]. It is
available on recent off-the-shelf processors based on the
Skylake microarchitecture or newer, and already has a wide
variety of research publications related to its applicability
on real world scenarios [10]. This technology allows user-
level code to be executed inside protected areas of memory,
named enclaves. This technology also provides means for
users/applications to verify if a given application is running
inside an Intel SGX enclave, and even check if the code
of the application is indeed the one expected to be running
there, a process called Remote Attestation [11].
Despite these advantages, Intel SGX has some limita-
tions regarding memory usage and code privacy that may
raise some concerns when using it in cloud environments.
Regarding memory, only a very limited area, up to 128 MB
in size, can be protected by the processor1. When this limit
is reached, data need to be swapped to/from the unprotected
DRAM, generating an overhead. Concerning code privacy,
SGX programming model does not prevent code disclosure,
since all enclave code can be viewed from the executable
file stored in the file system. These limitations will be better
discussed in the next sections of this paper.
In order to overcome these limitations, we propose
DynSGX, a privacy preserving toolset for dynamically load-
ing functions into and unloading functions from Intel SGX
enclaves. Our toolset enables developers to better manage
the scarce memory resources they have available to use with
Intel SGX, as well as to keep their applications private even
when being loaded into cloud environments.
The rest of the paper is divided as follows: in Section 2
we get into more details about Intel SGX, its limitations
1. https://download.01.org/intel-sgx/linux-1.9/docs/Intel SGX SDK
Developer Reference Linux 1.9 Open Source.pdf
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and possible vulnerabilities. We continue by introducing
DynSGX in Section 3. Further on, in Section 4, we present
an evaluation of our proposed solution. In Section 5 we
discuss published work related to our toolset. Finally, in
Section 6 we draw our conclusions, and describe some
possible future work to further improve our toolset.
2. INTEL SGX
Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) can be de-
scribed as a new set of instructions and changes in memory
access mechanisms added to the Intel Architecture. It is a
hardware-based technology that, like other TEE implemen-
tations, is used for ensuring security of sensitive data from
disclosure or modification [8]. SGX works as an “inverse
sandbox” mechanism, where code can be sealed inside an
enclave (i.e., private region of memory). Inside the enclave,
code and data are protected by hardware enforced access
control policies which prevent attacks against the enclave’s
content even when these originate from privileged software
such as virtual machine monitors and operating systems.
The protection of the enclaves is ensured by the creation
of a reserved area of memory called Processor Reserved
Memory (PRM), which is reserved by BIOS at boot time.
Inside the PRM lies another region of memory known as
Enclave Page Cache (EPC), also configured by BIOS at boot
time, where the enclaves’ pages actually reside. Access to
these pages is controlled by the processor and protected by
mechanisms such as the Memory Encryption Engine (MEE).
SGX also allows users to perform a Remote Attestation
(RA) process (i.e. cryptographically verify if the desired ap-
plication is running inside an SGX enclave). The generation
of the hardware-based material used in the RA process is
also enabled by the SGX instructions [11]. The RA process
can be used to establish a secure communication channel
between an application enclave and a user, by sharing a
symmetric key via an Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)
protocol. Users can then use this key to securely exchange
messages with an application running inside an enclave.
Possible applications of SGX have been discussed in
[10], where examples of applications that make use of the
SGX capabilities were presented, as well as an application
architecture including an application split between compo-
nents requiring security protection which should run within
enclaves, and components that do not require protection and
can therefore be executed outside enclaves. In [12], SGX
is used for securely communicating and aggregating fine-
grained smart metering data in a cloud environment.
2.1. SGX Components
The SGX solution comprises four main components: (i)
the set of instructions in the processor, (ii) the operating
system drivers, (iii) the Software Development Kit (SDK),
and (iv) the Platform Software (PSW).
2.1.1. SGX Instructions Set. SGX instructions set is avail-
able on off-the-shelf processors based on the Skylake mi-
croarchitecture or newer, starting from the 6th Generation
Intel Core family and on the 5th Xeon processors. It con-
sists of 17 new instructions that can be classified into the
following functions [8]:
• Enclave build/teardown: Used to allocate protected
memory for the enclave, load values into the protected
memory, measure the values loaded into the enclave’s
protected memory, and tear down the enclave after the
application has finished.
• Enclave entry/exit: Used to enter and exit the enclave.
An enclave can be entered and exited explicitly. It
may also be exited asynchronously due to interrupts
or exceptions. In the case of asynchronous exits, the
hardware will save all secrets inside the enclave, scrub
secrets from registers, and return to external program
flow. Later, it then resumes where it left off execution.
• Enclave security operations: Enable an enclave to
prove to an external party that the enclave was built
on hardware which supports the SGX instruction set.
• Paging instructions: Allow system software to se-
curely move enclave pages to and from unprotected
memory.
• Debug instructions: Allow developers to use familiar
debugging techniques inside special debug enclaves. A
debug enclave can be single stepped and examined.
A debug enclave cannot share data with a production
enclave. This protects enclave developers if a debug
enclave should escape the development environment.
2.1.2. SGX Drivers. The SGX drivers enable OSs and other
softwares to access the SGX hardware. Intel SGX drivers are
available both for Windows (via Intel Management Engine)2
and for Linux*3 platforms. They serve as an abstraction to
enable developers to write higher-level code for using the
device capabilities.
2.1.3. SGX SDK. The SGX Software Development Kit
(SDK) is a collection of APIs, sample source code, libraries
and tools that enable software developers to write and debug
SGX applications in C/C++. Intel SGX SDK is available
both for Windows, and for Linux* platforms2.
2.1.4. SGX PSW. The SGX Platform Software (PSW) is a
collection of special SGX enclaves, and an Intel SGX Appli-
cation Enclave Services Manager (AESM), provided along
with the SGX SDK. These special enclaves and AESM are
used when loading enclaves, retrieving cryptographic keys,
and evaluating the contents of an enclave.
2.2. SGX Memory Management
The memory management model of Intel SGX makes it
very useful for providing data security. The main aspects of
the memory model are discussed below:
• Enclave Page Cache: The Enclave Page Cache (EPC)
is protected memory used to store enclave pages and
2. https://software.intel.com/en-us/sgx-sdk/download
3. https://github.com/01org/linux-sgx-driver
SGX structures. The EPC is divided into 4KB chunks
called EPC pages. EPC pages can either be valid or
invalid. A valid EPC page contains either an enclave
page or an SGX structure. Each enclave instance has
an enclave control structure, SECS. Every valid en-
clave page in the EPC belongs to exactly one enclave
instance. System software is required to map enclave
virtual addresses to a valid EPC page.
• Memory Encryption Engine: Memory Encryption
Engine (MEE) is a hardware unit that encrypts and
protects the integrity of selected traffic between the
processor package and the main memory (DRAM). The
overall memory region that an MEE operates on is
called an MEE Region. Depending on implementation,
the PRM is covered by one or more MEE regions.
Intel SGX guarantees that all the data that leaves the
CPU and is stored in DRAM is first encrypted using
the MEE. Thus, even attackers with physical access to
DRAM will not be able to retrieve secret data protected
by SGX enclaves from it.
• Memory Access Semantics: CPU memory protection
mechanisms physically block access to PRM from all
external agents, by treating such accesses as references
to non-existent memory. To access a page inside an
enclave using MOV and other memory related instruc-
tions, the hardware checks the following:
– Logical processor is executing in “enclave mode”.
– Page belongs to enclave that the logical processor is
executing.
– Page accessed using the correct virtual address.
If any of these checks fails, the page access is treated
as reference to nonexistent memory, or by signaling a
fault. This guarantees that even a process with higher
privilege levels will not be able to access enclave’s
memory.
2.3. SGX Limitations
As with most technologies, Intel SGX has some limita-
tions that need to be considered by developers. The main
ones are the following:
• Code privacy: The entire enclave code can be viewed
from the executable file stored in the file system. The
code is protected from modification, but it does not
allow developers to maintain their code private. There
are many scenarios where developers want to keep
their code private, so this poses as a serious privacy
drawback, once attackers could reverse engineer the
enclave code by disassembling it, or even generating
a pseudocode very similar to the original one, through
tools like IDA4. We performed this attack and reverse-
engineered an enclave (.so file) containing a recursive
Fibonacci function, as depicted in Figure 1.
• Static linking: Applications that use third-party li-
braries need to statically link these libraries against
4. https://www.hex-rays.com/products/ida/index.shtml
their enclaves. This may result in generating a large
footprint for enclaves and, consequently, waste space
in memory – a scarce resource for SGX.
• Memory size: When starting a machine, BIOS needs
to reserve a portion of memory to the processor (PRM).
Also, the entire EPC must reside inside the PRM. In
the current version of SGX, this portion of memory is
limited to only 128 MB in size per machine. If the
space needed is more than the space available, a large
overhead in processing time is added, due to the need to
encrypt the data before swapping from EPC to DRAM
and decrypt the data after swapping from DRAM to
EPC. In [12] experiments are presented, showing that
randomly accessing memory is more than 100 times
more costly in SGX enclaves that need 128MB, which
results in exceeding the PRM size, in comparison with
unprotected applications.
Figure 1. Reversing engineering the enclave, a recursive Fibonacci function.
2.4. Vulnerabilities
SGX protects against many types of attacks, even from
privileged users and softwares. However, a side-channel
adversary is able to gather statistics from the CPU re-
garding execution and may be able to use them to deduce
characteristics of the software being executed. Examples of
analyses are power statistics, performance statistics includ-
ing platform cache misses, branch statistics via timing, and
information on pages accessed via page tables. It is well
documented that SGX does not defend against side-channel
adversaries [13], [14].
SGX components are complex and unlikely to be bug-
free, like any other software. There are drivers, libraries,
dependencies, and complex instructions available for de-
velopers. Moreover, enclave developers may make mistakes
and even the so-called protected areas may contain common
vulnerabilities like stack-based buffer overflows and uncon-
trolled format strings. This problem is boosted by the limited
portion of memory because it affects the effectiveness of the
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR).
ASLR is a security technique involved in protection
from many types of attacks. In order to prevent an attacker
from reliably jumping to, for example, a particular exploited
function in memory, ASLR randomly arranges the address
space positions of key data areas of a process, including
the base of the executable and the positions of the stack,
heap and libraries. With SGX, because the memory space
for an enclave is quite small, a simple brute force mechanism
can easily identify the correct address. In our experiments,
we observed that for different executions, an element has
its addresses changed by only two bytes, meaning that the
randomization is for approximately only 65536 possibilities.
This is very small, considering that an attacker can, for
example, increase the attack success probability through the
injection of NOP slides before a malicious code.
3. DYNSGX: DYNAMICALLY LOADING
FUNCTIONS INTO SGX ENCLAVES WITH
PRIVACY GUARANTEES
DynSGX aims at providing an alternative to the con-
ventional SGX programming model, where the entire code
of the application to be run inside an enclave needs to
be included in or linked against the enclave at build time.
Doing so could cause the enclave size to rapidly exceed the
available memory of the EPC and, consequently, cause a
large overhead in processing time due to the need to swap
pages. The conventional SGX programming model would
also cause the application code that runs in the enclave to
be completely visible after loading the enclave into memory.
Instead, DynSGX toolset allows users to start their se-
cure application with a very small enclave, and dynamically
load functions into and remove functions from the enclave
at runtime as needed. This allows users and developers to
better manage the amount of memory that is occupied by the
application code. Also, by using the RA process to establish
a secure communication channel and using SGX capabilities
to protect memory, DynSGX provides privacy guarantees for
the code loaded to the enclave at runtime.
3.1. DynSGX TCB
In DynSGX we limit the trusted computing base (TCB)
to the Intel SGX SDK/PSW plus a set of only six SGX-
compatible C/C++ functions, yielding an enclave with an
initial size of only 1.4MB. Such functions are used for (i)
performing the SGX RA process, (ii) loading functions into
the enclave, (iii) running loaded functions inside the enclave
and (iv) unloading functions from the enclave.
For the RA process, only the enclave ra init func-
tion needs to be placed inside the enclave. This function
internally calls the sgx ra init function from the SGX
SDK, which starts the RA process. To load functions
into the enclave, two functions are provided and placed
inside the enclave: enclave get fas, which is responsible
for providing a list of functions that are already reg-
istered inside the enclave, and enclave register function,
which is responsible for loading new functions into the
enclave. The enclave execute function can be used to se-
curely execute the functions that were loaded into the
enclave. Finally, DynSGX provides the functions en-
clave unregister function and enclave clear functions that
developers can use to unload functions from the enclave.
3.2. DynSGX Programming Model
DynSGX, as many other cloud-based tools, follows the
client-server model. The DynSGX enclave runs in the server
side, and developers interact with it from the client side.
DynSGX does not require developers to know how to
develop SGX applications. Instead, developers can write
their functions as they were writing regular C programs.
After writing their functions, the tool compiles the .c file
that contains the functions and then retrieves the bytes that
compose the compiled functions (this step can be done by
using a tool called bytes_extractor provided as part
of DynSGX). The bytes of the functions can then be sent to
be loaded into the enclave, and later on be executed inside it.
An important note is that the .c files are compiled with the
-fPIC flag so that the compiled code is position independent.
Let us consider an example where a user wants to
securely process a function to sum two integer numbers.
This sum function is depicted in Listing 1.
Listing 1. Sample C function for
summing two integer numbers.
1 int sum(int a, int b) {
2 return a + b;
3 }
Listing 2. Corresponding assem-
bly for the sum function.
1 push %rbp
2 mov %rsp,%rbp
3 mov %edi,-0x4(%rbp)
4 mov %esi,-0x8(%rbp)
5 mov -0x4(%rbp),%edx
6 mov -0x8(%rbp),%eax
7 add %edx,%eax
8 pop %rbp
9 retq
After compiling the file containing this function, the
bytes_extractor tool extracts the function bytes from
the assembled x86-64 code (Listing 2), resulting in the fol-
lowing hexstring: \x55\x48\x89\xe5\x89\x7d\x
fc\x89\x75\xf8\x8b\x55\xfc\x8b\x45\xf8\x01
\xd0\x5d\xc3. This hexstring can be loaded into the
DynSGX enclave, where it will be registered and stored in
the heap, a protected memory area. When the user needs to
execute this function, it will be casted to a regular function.
The user can unload their function from the enclave when
it is no longer needed, in order to free memory.
3.3. Application Lifecycle
DynSGX enclaves are started with only a limited number
of essential functions inside it. After the enclave is loaded,
developers/users can contact it to dynamically provision
their functions. After sending the functions, users can ex-
ecute them inside the DynSGX enclave, and even unload
them afterwards. The steps needed to complete this process
are illustrated in Figure 2 and described as follows:
1) The client communicates with the DynSGX enclave
and performs the RA process to verify the identity
Figure 2. DynSGX Software Lifecycle.
of the enclave and establish a secure communication
channel between both;
2) The client compiles the user provided functions, ex-
tracts the bytes of the generated binary file using
the bytes_extractor tool, and sends them to the
enclave via the secure communication channel. As a
response, it obtains an identifier of the loaded function;
3) Via the secure channel, the client requests the DynSGX
enclave to execute a dynamically loaded function, along
with any user provided function parameter. As a result,
the client receives the result of the execution;
4) The user uses the client to request the DynSGX enclave
to unload the functions to free memory space.
3.4. Distributed Linking
For a self-contained function (i.e., does not use external
elements), compiling and sending the bytes of the assembled
code is enough. However, if the function uses external
elements, a distributed mechanism is needed to map these
elements into their corresponding addresses at the enclave
side. Examples of external elements may be:
• Library functions, such as from the tlibc (trusted
libc, from the SGX SDK);
• Other functions previously defined by the user;
• Global variables.
DynSGX has an internal mechanism that retrieves the
addresses and return types of all functions available to the
enclave (i.e.: tlibc functions, functions loaded by the user,
etc.) and sends to the client a JSON like the one presented
in Listing 3, after the RA process is completed.
Listing 3. JSON mapping the external elements that can be used by a
function into their corresponding addresses.
1 {
2 "snprintf": "(*(int(*)(0x7f1e438176f0)))",
3 "vsnprintf": "(*(int(*)(0x7f1e4381d770)))",
4 "strcmp": "(*(int(*)(0x7f1e438179a0)))",
5 ...
6 }
Therefore, at the client side, for a function like the one
presented in Listing 4, the strcmp at line 3 is replaced
by (*(int(*)(0x7f1e438179a0))). This works be-
cause it is the same of casting and calling a function pointer.
The compiler does not know what will be in this address,
but in runtime, the strcmp function will be at this address
within the enclave.
Listing 4. Example of a function that uses an external element (the strcmp
function).
1 int check_password(char* input) {
2 char password[] = "topsecret123";
3 return !strcmp(input, password);
4 }
3.5. Requirements
To run the DynSGX enclave and load functions into it
in runtime, three requirements need to be met:
• SGX-capable hardware: SGX technology must be
available and enabled by BIOS. Such hardware is com-
mercially available since the end of 2015.
• SGX driver: SGX driver must be installed in order to
enable the OS and other softwares to access the SGX
hardware.
• SGX PSW: SGX PSW2 is used to launch SGX en-
claves, and also to generate data necessary for the RA
process. DynSGX requires a small modification in the
regular PSW. This modification regards the option to
make the program heap executable and is done by
applying a patch to the SGX PSW code5.
3.6. Vulnerabilities
Apart from side channel attacks and the vulnerabilities
that an enclave’s code may have, DynSGX introduces a new
attack surface: the function sent by the user. To provide its
features, DynSGX disables two security protections: stack
canaries at the user’s functions, and non-executable heap.
Stack canaries are used to detect a stack buffer overflow
before execution of malicious code can occur. This method
works by placing a small integer in the memory, the value
of which is randomly chosen at program start, just before
the stack return pointer. Most buffer overflows overwrite
memory from lower to higher memory addresses in order
to overwrite the return pointer (and thus take control of the
process). Therefore, the canary value is also overwritten.
This value is checked to make sure it has not changed before
a routine uses the return pointer on the stack. If the value
changes, the function stack chk fail from libc is called.
This function and its call, however, is introduced by the
compiler. A C programmer is not able to access it, neither
in the enclave side to get its address, nor in the client side to
replace its calling form. Therefore, the technique described
in Section 3.4 should not work for stack canaries.
Non-executable heap is a security protection that
helps to prevent certain exploits from succeeding, par-
ticularly those that inject and execute code in the
5. https://patch-diff.githubusercontent.com/raw/01org/linux-sgx/pull/63.
patch
heap. With DynSGX, user’s functions are dynamically
loaded into the heap space. Therefore, it was nec-
essary to disable this protection using the configura-
tion <HeapExecutable>1</HeapExecutable> at
the Enclave.config.xml file.
Given the limitation of the ASLR mechanism due the
small memory space, and the disabling of stack canaries and
non-executable heap protections, it is very important to put
more effort into developing secure codes. Listing 5 presents
an example of a vulnerable code that could be dynamically
loaded using DynSGX.
Listing 5. Example of a function vulnerable to stack buffer overflow.
1 void check_password(char *input) {
2 char buffer[16];
3 char password[] = "topsecret123";
4 strncpy(buffer, input, strlen(input));
5 if (!strcmp(buffer, password))
6 access();
7 }
This function is vulnerable to stack buffer over-
flow. If the attacker provides an input longer than 15
bytes, it will overwrite other values that could be in
the memory, like the value in the stack base pointer
and the return address. Considering that the address
of access is 0x7ffff580160d, an attacker could have
access overwriting the return address using the fol-
lowing payload: AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA\x0d
\x16\x80\xf5\xff\x7f\x00\x00.
Another example of vulnerability is uncontrolled format
string. A format function is a special kind of C function that
takes a variable number of arguments, from which one is
the so called format string. If an attacker is able to provide
the format string to a C format function in part or as a
whole, a format string vulnerability is present. By doing
so, the attacker can read and write to anywhere. Listing
6 presents an example of a code with uncontrolled format
string vulnerability.
Listing 6. Example of a function vulnerable to uncontrolled format string.
1 void check_password(char *input) {
2 char password[] = "topsecret123";
3 if (!strcmp(input, password)) {
4 access();
5 } else {
6 char error[30];
7 snprintf(error, 30, input);
8 strncat(error, " is incorrect!", 14);
9 log_msg(error);
10 }
11 }
In a normal situation, the effect of this function
is the same of the one presented in Listing 4, but
with the additional feature of logging an error message.
The uncontrolled format string vulnerability is at line
7, and an attacker can provide the following payload:
%10$p %11$p. Therefore, the function will log the fol-
lowing message: 0x6572636573706f74 0x33323174
is incorrect!. The numbers in hexadecimal are the
password representation in little endian format.
Given the limitations in the security protections, it is
very important to write the code carefully and do regular
code reviews. The usage of tools that examine source code
and report possible vulnerabilities (usually sorted by risk
level) may be useful. Flawfinder6, Cppcheck7 and Check-
ConfigMX [15] are examples of static analysis tools that
can be integrated with DynSGX for quickly finding and
removing at least some potential security problems before
sending a code to the enclave.
4. EVALUATION
To assess the performance of applications that use the
DynSGX toolset, we performed a series of experiments that
compare it to the pure C and regular SGX and program-
ming models. In this section we describe the experiments
performed, and present a discussion based on the results
obtained.
4.1. Experiments Setup
The experiments were conducted in a machine running
Ubuntu Linux 16.04 with one Intel i7-6700 SGX capable
processor and 8 GB of RAM. The server side of the
application is written in C++ and the client side is written
in Python 2.7.
In our experiments, we measured the latency that rep-
resents the total time taken from the client requesting the
server to process a function until the client receives the
response from the server. The latency also includes the time
taken to perform the RA process when RA is needed, and
to encrypt and decrypt data both in the client and in the
server to ensure privacy and security of data exchanged
between client and server. The latency was calculated based
on two different functions. The first one is the sum array
function, which iterates over an array of integers and com-
putes the sum of all of them, and the second one is the
recursive fibonacci function, which recursively calculates
the n-th term on a Fibonacci sequence. These two functions
were selected to illustrate a memory-intensive application (a
known limitation of SGX) and CPU-intensive application.
Three different implementations were made. The first
does not consider any security and privacy guarantees. The
second uses regular SGX programming model, with pri-
vacy and security guarantees of the data being processed
but no guarantees regarding the privacy of the code. The
third uses the DynSGX programming model, which enables
better manageability of the memory consumed by enclave
functions and privacy of the code being executed inside the
enclave. For the SGX and DynSGX implementations, we
considered both the cases where the RA process is needed
to establish a secure communication channel, and where the
secure communication channel had already been established.
4.2. The Experiments
The experiments consisted of two parts. The first part
aimed to compare the latency for the computation of the
6. https://www.dwheeler.com/flawfinder/
7. http://cppcheck.sourceforge.net/
(a) Latency of sum array function (b) Latency of recursive fibonacci function
Figure 3. Latency comparison between pure C, Intel SGX and DynSGX implementations
sum array function for arrays with 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128,
and 256 MB in size. Figure 3a depicts the median values
of latency obtained in this part. This experiment is useful
to understand the behavior of using DynSGX with iterative
functions and with higher memory usage.
The second part aimed to compare the latency for the
computation of the recursive fibonacci for n values of 1,
5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, and 45. Figure 3b depicts
the median values of latency in this part. This experiment
is important to understand the behavior of using DynSGX
with recursive functions.
In both parts of the experiment, for each array size and
n value, 30 runs were executed.
4.3. Discussion
As can be seen in Figure 3, both SGX and DynSGX im-
plementations always exhibit considerable overheads when
compared to the unprotected pure-C implementation. This is
due to two main factors: (i) the time taken to perform the
RA process and (ii) the need to encrypt and decrypt data.
From the experiments results we can also observe that
for processing iterative functions, DynSGX has only a small
overhead compared to the regular SGX use. This behavior
can be observed both when the RA process is needed and
when a secure channel has already been established. In this
case, we consider the benefits of using DynSGX significant
because of the code privacy guarantees and the possibility
to manage memory occupied by code.
Nevertheless, it is important to notice that DynSGX
may not perform as well when processing recursive func-
tions. Figure 3b depicts this situation, where the recur-
sive fibonacci function grows exponentially in number of
recursive calls. In this case, DynSGX performs much slower
than the regular SGX implementation. This is due to the fact
that with DynSGX the function code resides in the heap,
which is considered a data segment, and competes with
other data areas (such as the stack frames of each recursive
call) for a space in the processor cache. Modern processors
have different caches for instructions and data, hence, the
TABLE 1. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON BETWEEN PURE C, SGX AND
DYNSGX IMPLEMENTATIONS
Integrity Privacy Performance
Impl. data code data code iterative recursive
Pure C High High
SGX 3 3 3 Medium Medium
DynSGX 3 3 3 3 Medium Low
advantage of regular SGX with code at the instructions
segment. This behavior is not limited to DynSGX; a pure
C or regular SGX implementation of a recursive algorithm
that stores code in the heap also suffers some overhead.
Regarding security aspects, it is also important to note
that disabling stack canaries and enabling heap execution
may not imply a risk to the hardware owner, since in a cloud
environment it is possible to set up other security layers. For
example, the DynSGX enclave could run inside an isolated
environment of a virtual machine.
Table 1 contains a comparison of advantages and disad-
vantages of each of the three implementations considered in
our experiments.
5. RELATED WORK
Intel has recently introduced SGX2, which extends the
SGX instruction set by adding support for dynamic memory
management from inside SGX enclaves [16]. SGX2 will
allow lazy loading enclave code into the EPC, instead of
loading it at once at enclave load time. This will avoid
the need of DynSGX to make the modification to the SGX
PSW described on Section 3. On the other hand, SGX2
does not address any of the code privacy concerns addressed
by DynSGX. Besides that, SGX2 does not aim at enabling
developers to create new functions and loading them into
enclaves after they have been built, but only to dynamically
load and unload code that is already linked against enclaves.
In [17] SCONE is proposed. SCONE enables develop-
ers to compile their C applications into Docker containers
protected with the SGX capabilities. Developers can simply
compile their C applications with a special compiler that
is part of the SCONE toolset, and deploy the compiled
application in a SCONE client, and it will transparently be
protected by SGX capablities.
SecureWorker8 is an NPM package that allows
JavaScript code to be run inside SGX enclaves. It is still
under development, and many important features (e.g., re-
mote attestation) are yet to be implemented.
On the one hand, both SCONE and SecureWorker solu-
tions, like DynSGX, ease the development of SGX solutions.
On the other hand, both SCONE and SecureWorker lack the
capabilities of dynamically loading code into SGX enclaves
and preserving the privacy of such code.
A known approach for code privacy is obfuscation [18].
It makes the code difficult for humans to understand and
programmers may deliberately obfuscate code to conceal
its purpose (security through obscurity), primarily, in order
to prevent reverse engineering. However, Barak et al. [19]
perform a theoretical investigation and prove that, secure
obfuscation is impossible. It is known that a talented hacker
can reverse engineer code even after being obfuscated.
6. CONCLUSION
Intel SGX has been considered to be one of the most
promising TEE technologies. TEEs can enable application
with sensitive data to run on the cloud. However, its limita-
tions and code privacy concerns have drawn its applicability
in cloud environments into question. This paper presented
a toolset that enables users to dynamically deploy their
functions into enclaves and also ensures the privacy of
such functions. Our evaluation shows that DynSGX enables
developers to load/unload functions into/from enclaves and
can be used to guarantee the privacy of code to be executed
inside SGX enclaves with a small overhead compared to the
regular SGX programming model. We have also shown that
recursive functions with many recursive calls may not be
suitable for use with DynSGX.
As future work we plan to extend DynSGX to provide
support for programming languages other than C. In addi-
tion, we want to provide the developer/user with functions
that enable a more detailed monitoring and, consequently, a
more efficient management of the enclave memory.
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